Granted, a Bayesian might hold that rationality places no constraint on probabilistic judgments beyond coherence (or conformity to the probability calculus). Then as long as the strict atheist assigns probability 1 to God's non-existence alongside his or her assignment of 0 to God's existence, no norm of rationality has been violated.
Furthermore, an assignment of p = 0 would clearly block the route to Pascal's conclusion. For then the expectation calculations become:
E(wager for God) = ∞*0 + f1*(1 − 0) = f1
E(wager against God) = f2*0 + f3*(1 − 0) = f3
And nothing in the argument implies that f1 > f3. (Indeed, this inequality is questionable, as even Pascal seems to allow.) In short, Pascal's wager has no pull on strict atheists.
true, indeed. no pull.
but have you got an equation?
nope, so I must be an aeqationist too.
Wales has a proud history in equations that your comment led me to explore. See today's post.
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